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Abstract: Hazard identification and hazard analysis are difficult and essential parts of safety engineering. These ac-
tivities are very demanding and mostly manual. There is an increasing need for improved analysis tools and
techniques. In this paper we report research that focuses on supporting the early stages of hazard identification.
A state-based hazard analysis process is presented to explore dependencies between causes and consequences
of hazards. The process can be used to automate the analysis of preliminary hazard worksheets with the aims
of making them more precise, disambiguating causal relationships, and supporting the proper definition of
system boundaries. An application example is presented for a railway system.
1 INTRODUCTION
Hazard identification and hazard analysis are dif-
ficult and essential parts of safety engineering. These
activities are very demanding and mostly manual.
There is an increasing need for improved analysis
tools and techniques. In this paper we report research
that focuses on supporting the early stages of haz-
ard identification. Hazard analysis is the identifica-
tion of hazards and their initiating causes (Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization, 2000). It can
be thought of as the process of investigating an acci-
dent before it actually occurs. Its aim is to exhaus-
tively identify all possible causes of accidents, so that
they can be eliminated or controlled before they oc-
cur (Leveson, 2011). Hazard analysis is extremely
important, and lack of completeness in the analysis
can have serious consequences.
A hazard is a potential source of harm. The term
includes danger to persons arising within a short time
scale, for example, fire and explosion, and also those
that have a long-term effect on a person’s health, such
as release of a toxic substance (ISO, 1999). Harm is
a physical injury or damage to the health of people or
damage to property or the environment (ISO, 1999).
Hazard identification (HazID) is one of the most
important parts of the hazard analysis, as it forms the
basis of the activities carried out to design a safe sys-
tem. By looking at the system from a safety per-
spective, safety analysts check important aspects of
the system and try to identify hazards that could have
been accidentally overlooked. Common methods for
identifying hazards at the early stages of system de-
sign are checklists, HAZOPs (Hazard and Operabil-
ity Studies) and PHA (Preliminary Hazard Analy-
sis) (Kletz, 2001).
Various studies asserted that the most significant
flaws in hazard analysis techniques applied at the
early stages of system design are often related to
the omission of hazards and hazard causes (Hardy,
2010). One reason for this could be that most haz-
ard analysis techniques rely on the manual analysis
of information recorded in text format using differ-
ent spreadsheet representations, called hazard identi-
fication worksheets. The most basic description of a
worksheet would be a table of three columns, where
the first column describes a hazard, the second col-
umn describes the cause or causes of that hazard, and
the third column describes the consequences of the
hazard occurring. Different examples of this basic de-
scription will be discussed further in this paper.
Data and facts are usually abundant in hazard
analysis worksheets. Because of this, for complex
systems, there is always a good chance that even ex-
pert analysts could accidentally miss something, and
therefore draw conclusions on the basis of incom-
plete information. A mechanised process for system-
atic exploration of the dependencies between hazards,
causes and consequences of hazards would therefore
be a convenient way of supporting experts during the
analysis.
Various initiatives in the safety sectors are explor-
ing the use of ontologies as a means to mechanise
the analysis of causal dependencies in hazard analysis
techniques. The aims of these initiatives are generally
to capture consensual knowledge, reuse it and share
it across different application domains and different
teams (Corcho et al., 2003). For example, in (Mayer
et al., 2008), an ontology is described for representing
risk and risk assessment processes, as well as con-
cepts such as hazards and threats. Others have ex-
plored the use of ontologies to support standard haz-
ard analysis techniques, such as Job Hazard Analy-
sis (e.g., see (Wang and Boukamp, 2009)), HAZOP
(e.g., see (Stralhane et al., 2010; Daramola et al.,
2011)), and FMEA (e.g., see (LEE, 2001)), or other
hazard analysis techniques targeted to industrial sec-
tors like construction, food supply (Letia and Groza,
2010; Yang et al., 2012), geology (Liu et al., 2010),
and many others.
Despite all the examples above, little attention has
been devoted to using ontologies for the analysis of
preliminary hazard worksheets generated at the early
stages of system design. Being able to analyse these
preliminary worksheets is highly desirable, as issues
can be resolved earlier in the development process,
when it is easier and cheaper to fix problems. The
present work aims to address this gap.
Contribution. In this paper we present an approach
to facilitate the analysis of preliminary hazard work-
sheets generated at the early stages of system de-
sign. The approach facilitates the resolution of weak-
nesses in the hazard identification process. In our ap-
proach, an ontology is used to review preliminary haz-
ard worksheets using a mechanised process based on
a set of inference rules. Our approach allows one to
check well-formedness of hazards, their causes, and
consequences, as well as to discover new relation-
ships between hazards, causes and consequences, if
these were accidentally omitted in the hazard work-
sheets. The final result obtained using our approach is
therefore an improved version of preliminary hazard
worksheets, with disambiguated hazards and polished
causal relationships.
Organisation. The paper is organised as follows. In
Section 2, we contrast and compare our work with
related work. In Section 3, we introduce our ontology.
Then, in Section 4, we explain our proposed method,
its steps, and the reasoning we used. In Section 5,
we illustrate the method on a case study. Finally, in
Section 6, we briefly conclude, summarise the results,
and discuss future work.
2 RELATED WORK
A number of different hazard analysis techniques
have been created over the last fifty years, and they
are currently widely used by safety-critical industries.
There are different examples of their use in com-
plex systems (Leach, 2010; Zhang et al., 2010; Cen-
ter for Devices and Radiological Health, US FDA,
2010). There are also examples of adaptations of stan-
dard hazard analysis techniques for identifying secu-
rity hazards (Winther et al., 2001).
Despite the wide use of the standard hazard anal-
ysis techniques mentioned above, there is also strong
criticism of them. New techniques are, in fact, being
proposed that are specifically designed for the anal-
ysis of hazards in today’s complex socio-technical
systems. For example, Nancy Leveson describes a
new approach to hazard analysis, STPA (System-
Theoretic Process Analysis) (Leveson, 2011), based
on the STAMP causality model. Another example
is the Ontological Hazard Analysis (OHA) (Ladkin,
2005; Ladkin, 2010) proposed by Peter Ladkin for the
analysis and maintenance of safety hazard lists using
a refinement approach.
Differently from the efforts cited above, we do
not aim to introduce a novel hazard analysis tech-
nique. Rather, we propose a mechanised method that
can improve the analysis of results obtained at the
early stages of system design. In the method pre-
sented in this paper, we start from preliminary haz-
ard worksheets, and use an ontology to check consis-
tency and well-formedness of information contained
in these preliminary documents.
Finally, in his book called HAZOP and
HAZAN (Kletz, 2001), Trevor Kletz discusses
the feasibility of the automation of HAZOPs, for
example, applying techniques from Artificial Intel-
ligence, and whether these techniques could replace
the safety analyst. Kletz concludes it is impossible.
He gives two important objections to the automation
of HAZOPs:
1. Artificial intelligence techniques can manipulate
logical rules, but logic is just one aspect of hu-
man intelligence. For example, most of the scien-
tists who have recounted how they came to make
an important discovery or to achieve a significant
breakthrough have stressed that when they found
the answer to the crucial problem they intuitively
recognised it to be right, and only subsequently
went back and worked out why it was right (Kletz,
2001).
2. Knowledge used in HAZOPs is broad and deep,
while expert systems are suitable only for narrow
and deep knowledge (Kletz, 2001).
Logic is not able to represent all the knowledge
and expertise of the safety analyst. We do not aim
to represent this; instead, we want to represent the
knowledge already captured by hazard identification
techniques, usually in worksheets. We want to be
able to find logical relationships, which could have
not been seen, and point out the relevant information
that might have been hidden because of the quantity
of information represented.
3 DEVELOPING THE
ONTOLOGY PROTOTYPE
Ontologies, or explicit representations of do-
main concepts, provide the basic structure or
framework around which knowledge bases can be
built (Devedzic´, 2002; Swartout and Tate, 1999). On-
tologies are specific, high-level models of knowledge
underlying all things, concepts, and phenomena. As
with other models, ontologies do not represent the en-
tire world of interest. Rather, ontology designers se-
lect aspects of reality relevant to their tasks (Devedzic´,
2002; Valente et al., 1999).
During the design of the ontology prototype, we
used a UML-like modelling language. It has been
argued that UML can be used to model ontolo-
gies (Cranefield and Purvis, 1999), yet there are re-
cent, more specialised modelling languages, like On-
toUML (Benevides et al., 2010).
We decided to use the ontology engineering en-
vironment Prote´ge´ because it provides an integrated
environment for the ontology development and it has
different features supporting different tasks during
the ontology life cycle. The knowledge representa-
tion language of choice was OWL-DL because it is
the most used by the ontology development commu-
nity (Simperl et al., 2009), and because OWL-DL and
SWRL offer a number of sophisticated reasoning ca-
pabilities.
3.1 Ontology Domains
When developing an ontology, we aim to formally
and explicitly describe concepts in a domain, as well
as their properties. Describing the concepts involves
defining classes for these concepts and arranging
them in a hierarchy.
The first domain we work on is the HazID work-
sheets HI, which consist of different hazards with
multiple causes and where different consequences
might exist.
Table 1 shows a basic example of the main
part of a HazID worksheet. The example is taken
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Figure 2: Part of Ontology
from (Evans and Associates, 2006). The hazard de-
scription for hazards A− 5 is Toxic gases in tunnel.
The cause of this hazard is Toxic gases enter in tun-
nel from alignment or station. The alignment in the
context of a railway is the ground plan of the railway,
as well as the path that the train follows. The con-
sequences for hazard A− 5 are injury, death or ser-
vice disruption. Another cause of hazard Toxic gases
in tunnel is Maintenance personnel release toxic gas
while performing work.
Figure 1 shows the concepts of Hazard, Cause,
and Consequence represented in our ontology and the
relationships among them. Boxes in the figure repre-
sent the concepts, arrows with triangular heads rep-
resent inheritance, and arrows with two heads repre-
sent the relationships. The concepts can be used to
define a set of hazards, H, consisting of h1 . . .hn indi-
vidual hazards; a set of causes, consisting of c1 . . .cn
individual causes; a set of consequences, consisting
of q1 . . .qn individual consequences. Figure 1 shows
the relationships among these concepts. The rela-
tionships cause-hazard and hazard-consequence are
many-to-many. That is, a cause might occur on differ-
ent hazards, and a consequence might occur on sev-
eral hazards. In the hierarchy of types, Situation is a
higher node and the super type for Hazard, Cause and
Consequence.
Hazard identification is performed within a sys-
tem and its boundaries. In order to represent our ba-
sic ontology, we need to define two core concepts
to represent the characteristics of a system and its
behaviour. We chose Object Process Methodology
(OPM) (Crawley and Dori, 2011) because it is geared
towards modelling systems in general. From an on-
tological perspective, OPM’s building blocks are ob-
jects and processes. We use these concepts in order
to represent the initial design of the system and its
Table 1: Basic example of HazID worksheet
Hazard Cause Consequence
A−5 Toxic gases enter in tunnel from alignment or station Injury, death,
Toxic gases in tunnel Maintenance personnel release toxic gas while performing work service disruption
behaviour. An object can be a system, subsystem,
component or a part of the system. The object can be
in a particular state. Processes transform objects by
generating, consuming, or changing their state (Craw-
ley and Dori, 2011). A process can be decomposed
into sub-processes. Figure 7 shows an example of
OPM’s building blocks, where Transporting is a pro-
cess. This process involves the objects Tracks, Align-
ment, LRV, Platform and Station.
”System”, is an important concept we need to
represent in our ontology. The physical domain of
the system is composed of subsystems. Subsystems,
in turn, are composed of components, and compo-
nents are composed of parts. From the CLIOS for-
malism (Sussman et al., 2009), we take the notion
of Common drivers, which are shared components
among subsystems of a system.
Figure 2 shows the concepts of Object, Process,
System, Subsystem, Component, Common Driver
and Part Modelled. The initial design of a system S,
consists of different natural divisions such as subsys-
tem B, componentM, part P. We identify a set of sub-
systems, B, consisting of b1 . . .bn individual subsys-
tems; a set of components, M, consisting of m1 . . .mn
individual components; and finally, a set of parts, P,
consisting of individual parts p1 . . . pn. A part might
occur within a component, so then the relationship is
one-to-one. Similarly, the relationship between com-
ponent and subsystem and between subsystem and
system is one-to-one. In addition, a system has a re-
cursive relationship, where a system can be part of an-
other system, and the relationship will again be one-
to-one.
The behavioural description of the system is de-
scribed as the set of objects, O, consisting of o1 . . .on
individual objects; the set of processes, C, consisting
of c1 . . .cn individual processes. An object may par-
ticipate in different processes and a process may oc-
cur in different objects, so the relationship is many-
to-many.
Figure 3 shows that subsystem A is a member of
system B. They have different system boundaries and,
as a result, concentrate on different hazards. System
B provides the environment for subsystem A. A haz-
ard, normally, is described with respect to its system
boundary, so it is a relative term.
Figure 5 shows fundamental concepts of the ba-
sic ontology. ”Thing” is a generalisation of objects,
processes and situations; it represents the class of all
Subsystem A
System B
Hazard A Hazard B
Figure 3: Hazard in Systems. Based on (Railtrack, 2001)
things, or the abstract objects that can be described
by the criteria for being something. This concept is
taken from class-defined ontologies. In addition, Fig-
ure 6 shows four new relationships that we need to
discuss. The hazard information within the ontology
needs to include information such as the scope and lo-
cation of the hazards. When we talk about the scope
of a hazard, we refer to what affects the hazard di-
rectly; we therefore refer to two kind of scopes: be-
havioralScope and physicalScope. If a hazard affects
a determined system, that system will be the scope of
the hazard. When we refer to the physicalScope we
refer to the boundary of the hazard. For example, if
subsystem A is a member of system B, then system B
is the scope of subsystem A. When we talk about loca-
tion, we refer to where the hazard is located in terms
of objects and also in terms of processes; the relation-
ships that we will use will be called physicalLocation
and behaviouralLocation.
Hazards, causes and consequences could be inter-
linked by any of these characteristics. This kind of
knowledge is already known by the safety analyst or
it can be deduced by reading the HazID description.
The idea is that information provided by these rela-
tionships (object properties in Prote´ge´) offer a natu-
ral way to establish associations among hazard mean-
ing, or senses, in a certain HazID process. This can
be profitably used during the processing of the haz-
ard worksheets, e.g., to disambiguate the process. For
example, the hazard virus affecting the system, when
referring to an infusion pump medical device, is am-
biguous between its Biology and Computer Science
senses and, therefore, the system boundary of the haz-
ard, can be disambiguated by assigning the correct do-
mains to the contexts where it actually occurs.
Figure 4: Class hierarchy of complete ontology
3.2 Extended Ontology
In this subsection we explain in detail the extended
ontology. The extended ontology is formed using
more specific types, i.e., lower nodes in the hierar-
chy. This provides a more granular organisation of
the hazards, causes and consequences, and relation-
ships between them. Figure 4 shows a more detailed
hierarchy of the classes in our ontology.
Hazards have a scope. In order to generate a hi-
erarchy to hazards according to their scope, we cre-
ate equivalent classes called PartHazard, Componen-
tHazard, SubsystemHazard and SystemHazard. When
editing the ontology, the analyst can decide which of
the SystemHazards belong to the HighPriorityHaz-
ards. These are the hazards that are deemed the most
important for analysis by the safety analyst. The class
GenericHazards is useful to handle worksheets with
generic hazards identified using, e.g., a Preliminary
Hazard Analysis.
The class ConsequenceHazard is a subclass of
class Hazard. The classes Consequence and Cause-
Hazard are subclasses of Hazards and Cause.
4 THE METHOD
We developed an ontology to capture domain in-
formation related to hazards, systems, and hazards
within a system. The ontology is designed to help
the analysts in the task of hazard identification using
the knowledge already gathered, and the relationships
    HazID 
worksheets
 Initial design 
of the system
Ontology description 
         and 
inference rules
Input A Input B
knowledge base
End
Populate ontology with 
Input A and Input B
Finding relationships among 
   hazards, causes and 
         consequences
Reviewed 
HazID
   Amended 
system design
   Does it 
need more 
processing?
Figure 5: Control flow diagram of our method
that already exist. An ontology provides the means
to structure information by classes, property descrip-
tions and relationships between classes and individ-
uals. Analysts can use the ontology for reasoning
about missing relationships between hazards, causes
and consequences. Figure 5 shows the steps of our
method:
1. We start from an initial Preliminary Hazard Anal-
ysis, an initial design of the system, an ontol-
ogy description of the domains, and a set of rules
for reasoning about our domains. The ontology
description models the data from the inputs il-
lustrated above, including property descriptions
and relationships between classes and individu-
als. We used the open-source editor and frame-
work Prote´ge´ 5.0 (Stanford Center for Biomedi-
cal Informatics Research, 2015). The output is
our knowledge base.
2. The next step is to find possible indirect causal
ConsequenceHazard Cause
SituationObject
Thing
isConsequenceOf
isCauseOf
physicalLocation
physicalScope
behaviouralLocation
behaviouralScope
involves
Process
isSubproessOf
Figure 6: Core classes of the ontology
and overlooked relationships. This is ilustrated
in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. The intention is to use
the structured and automated reasoning provided
by tools for the analysis of ontologies, such as
Prote´ge´’s built-in reasoner, Pellet.
3. The initial results are used to review the HazID
worksheet, and perhaps modify the System De-
sign model. Yet more could be done after the first
amendment, and our knowledge base could still
be reviewed and amended further.
4.1 Reasoning Using the Ontology
In this subsection we will explain some concepts that
are needed to understand the reasoning approach im-
plemented with the ontology. The approach will also
be illustrated with concrete examples.
4.1.1 Direct and Indirect Causality
In (Leveson, 2011) Leveson argues that current haz-
ard analysis techniques are event chain models of the
form: ”if event A had not occurred, then the following
event Bwould not have occurred”. This type of model
supports limited notions of direct causality, and it is
sometimes impossible to incorporate indirect relation-
ships. For example, consider the following statement:
“Smoking causes lung cancer”. It is argued (Leveson,
2011) that in current models such a statement would
not be allowed; however, it is widely accepted that
there is a relationship between the two, even though
the relationship is complex and indirect.
4.1.2 Synonymy, Entailment and Non-Direct
Causality
Hazard identification is a demanding task and relies
on detailed descriptions. It is difficult to remember
each and every hazard and cause in a hazard analysis
and, as a consequence, the worksheets may refer to
hazards, causes and consequences in different written
forms. Sometimes this reflects real differences that
should be captured, while in other situations the dif-
ferences are only artificial, and should therefore be
amended. For example, when analysing a road sys-
tem, we could have the following hazards: H−1 Ve-
hicle drives on the wrong lane; H− 2 Vehicle passes
through the wrong lane; H− 3 Vehicle on the wrong
lane. H − 1 and H − 3 could have the same mean-
ing, or H − 3 could mean that the vehicle actually
stopped on the wrong lane. H − 1 and H − 2 could
also have the same meaning if each just means that
a vehicle temporarily drives on the wrong lane. An
ontology could help the analyst to find and identify
these hazards, as well as to disambiguate them, when
needed, by means of logical rules applied to the struc-
tured knowledge.
When two situations (hazards, causes, conse-
quences) have the same meaning, we will call them
synonyms. Using only inference rules, we cannot de-
termine whether a hazard is a synonym of another
hazard, cause or consequence. To resolve the prob-
lem, we rely on different relationships established be-
tween situations that are part of the HazID entry. For
example, two synonym hazards might have the same
physical location, physical scope, behavioural loca-
tion, or behavioural scope. Therefore, using rules to
find hazards where multiple similar relationships oc-
cur can help to spot synonyms. In addition, a syn-
onym is not the only kind of relationship that can be
spotted. For example, let us consider hazard H − 4
Train on fire. The cause of this hazard isCa−1 Train
stopped adjacent to a wayside fire. A train circulates
around different places in a railway system; it also can
stop at different places. For example, it can stop at the
platform, which can be on fire. Following this rea-
Transporting
Station
Passenger
Platform
Alignment
Tracks
LRV
waits at
travels on
built on
Figure 7: Top level representation of our initial system de-
sign in OPM
soning, there might be a relationship between a haz-
ard called H− 5 Fire on station platform and Ca− 1
Train stopped adjacent to a wayside fire. Therefore,
there might be a nonlinear (indirect) causal relation-
ship betweenH−5 Fire on station platform andH−4
Train on fire.
In logic, entailment (Fellbaum, 1990), or strict
implication, is properly defined for propositions; a
proposition P entails a proposition Q if and only if
there is no conceivable state of affairs that could make
P true and Q false. Entailment is a semantic relation-
ship because it involves reference to the states of af-
fairs that P and Q represent. We generalise the term
in order to talk about hazards. For us, in the context
of the hazard descriptions for a certain system, entail-
ment refers to the special relationship between two
hazards, where a hazard, H1, of a more general haz-
ard, H2, also entails H2. In addition, if H1 entails
H2, then it can not be the case that H2 entails H1.
In order to explain this, we introduce a brief exam-
ple. We mentioned before that the alignment in the
context of a railway is the ground plan of the railway,
as well as the path that the train follows. The cross-
ing is the crossroad between the train path and the
motor road. Hazards H − 6 Motor vehicle on align-
ment and H − 7 Road vehicle drives around cross-
ing gate refer to a motor vehicle inside the train path.
Because the crossing is part of the path of the train,
H − 7 entails H − 6, because while a motor vehicle
drives around the crossing gate, the motor vehicle is
on the alignment. In addition, H − 6 does not entail
H − 7 because Motor vehicle on alignment does not
necessarily mean that the vehicle is driving around the
alignment. Using inference rules and a reasoner could
therefore help the safety analyst to disambiguate the
meaning of those hazards and also to find hazards in-
terlinked by the causation relationships. The follow-
ing section will exemplify some of these rules and
their application using a case study based on a rail-
way system.
5 CASE STUDY
We now introduce a case study that we use to illus-
trate the method: the West Corridor Light Rail Tran-
sit (LRT) System. Figure 7 shows a representation of
the system in Object Process Modelling (OPM). The
hazard analysis that we use is the Preliminary Hazard
Analysis (PHA) for the West Corridor LRT Project
Design Phase (Evans and Associates, 2006). The de-
scription of the system was inferred from the PHA
document and from terminology in rail transport and
railways (www.allenrailroad.com, 2014; Transport
Canada, 2014; www.railway-technical.com, 2014;
www.trafficsigns.us, 2014; www.railsigns.uk, 2014).
We succinctly describe the system:
• Alignment provides a path and physical infras-
tructure, such as tunnels and crossrails.
• Track is the structure consisting of the rails, fas-
teners, sleepers, and ballast, plus the underlying
subgrade. The track provides the physical struc-
ture by which the Light Rail Vehicle (LRV) circu-
lates.
• A station is a railway facility where trains reg-
ularly stop to load or unload passengers and/or
freight.
• A control system provides help in controlling the
train to prevent accidents and to improve circu-
lation. The service provided can be concisely
described as: train separation or collision avoid-
ance, line speed enforcement, enforcing tempo-
rary speed restrictions, enabling rail worker way-
side safety.
• An Overhead Catenary System (OCS) comprises
different components, such as wires suspended
between poles, bridges supporting overhead con-
tact wires which are normally energised with elec-
tricity, etc. The OCS powers the LRV.
• The LRV is the vehicle that circulates along the
railway and transports passengers.
Figure 7 represents only the top level of the pro-
cess representation. The process Transporting is re-
lated to the objects by the relationship processIn-
volves. In this case, the process involves the objects
LRV, Alignment, Tunnel, Track and Platform. Sub-
processes of Transporting are: Carrying passengers,
Circulating, Grade crossing management, Guiding
LRV, Loading and unloading passengers, and Trans-
mitting power. All these processes are related to ob-
jects and have subprocesses as well. We will mention
some of the processes while developing our examples
in the sections below.
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Figure 8: Relationships among individuals, exemplifying the relationships that are used in example 5.1
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5.1 Example with Non-Direct Causality
Let us start from a small subset of the PHA per-
formed. Below, we define the rule that helps us to
find non-direct or indirect causality between hazards
and causes. The property representing this relation-
ship is isIndirectCauseOf.
physicalLocationOf(?q,?o),
behaviouralLocationOf(?p,?a),
Object(?o),
Situation(?p),
processInvolves(?a,?o),
physicalLocationOf(?p,?o1),
isMemberOf(?o,?o1),
Situation(?q),
Process(?a)
→ mightRelate(?p,?q)
(1)
This rule is explained as follows. Every situa-
tion happens within some object (based on the bound-
ary of hazards). The property representing this is
physicalLocationOf (a,b). We need to represent this
property since any situation, that could affect the be-
haviour of the system, depends on where this situation
occurs. In our ontology, the behaviour of the system is
described via processes; a process may involve vari-
ous objects (processInvolves(e, f ) property). We need
also to record which process(es) could be directly af-
fected by a situation, and we do this using the property
behaviouralLocationOf (c,d).
Figure 8 helps us to understand better how it is
going to happen. We can see three kinds of things
(Objects, Situations and Processes) and different re-
lationships among them, and that all are related by
the process Circulating. This process describes the
actions of the LRV passing directly through different
objects. Therefore, the Circulating process involves
objects such as tunnel, alignment, platform at a sta-
tion and railway crossings. The situation LRV stopped
adjacent to a wayside fire refers to anywhere within
the Railway system. This situation affects the process
Circulating. Also, there exists a relationship among
the situations Fire on station platform, Fire in tunnel
andFire on alignment because the physical locations
of all these situations are involved with the process
Circulating. Last, the physical locations of all those
different situations are related by a transitive, hierar-
chical relationshipMemberOf.
Rule 1, in our example, returns as an answer that
Cause LRV stopped adjacent to a wayside fire might
relate to (mightRelate) hazards Fire on station plat-
form, Fire on tunnel, Fire on Alignment and LRV fire.
It is not a reflexive relationship. LRV stopped adja-
cent to a wayside fire is definitely related to LRV fire
because the former is a direct cause of the latter. What
we could conclude is that any of those hazards could
be indirect causes of LRV fire. Figure 9 illustrates this,
and we can add this relationship (isIndirectCauseOf )
to our knowledge base.
5.2 Another example on Non-Direct
Causality
Let us examine another example. We will first give
some definitions related to railways. A grade cross-
ing is an intersection where a road passes across a line
of railway at a grade. A grade is a part of a railway
or road that slopes upwards or downwards. A grade
crossing warning system consist of all of the elements
or warning devices such as signals, signs, lights and
horns that automatically alert the public that a train is
approaching. Figure 10 illustrates that Grade cross-
ing warning system is part of Crossing in a railway.
This object has a clear functionality, which is process
Warning at crossing. Situations TC− 6 and Ca− 8
both happened within object Grade crossing warning
system and refer to the behaviour of process Warn-
ing at crossing. In addition, the physical scope of
both situations is the wider object Crossing (Grade
crossing warning system is part of Crossing). Rule 2,
below, helps us to discover this possible relationship.
The property physicalScope refers to the boundary of
the hazard. As explained earlier, if a hazard affects a
determined system, that system will be the scope of
the hazard. The property isSubProcessOf exemplifies
that a process can be decomposed into subprocesses.
The rest of the properties have been explained while
describing Rule 1.
physicalLocationOf(?h,?l2),
behaviouralLocationOf(?s,?p1),
behaviouralLocationOf(?h,?p2),
physicalScopeOf(?h,?c),
physicalLocationOf(?s,?l1),
physicalScopeOf(?s,?c),
isSubProcessOf(?p1,?p3),
Situation(?s),
isSubProcessOf(?p2,?p3),
Situation(?h)
→ possibleEntailment(?s,?h)
(2)
Using Rule 2, we can discover a relationships
between cause Insufficient warning before gate de-
scends and hazard Grade crossing warning system
Table 2: Table representing a small subset of the PHA for the case study (Evans and Associates, 2006)
Hazard Cause
A−1 LRV fire Ca−1 LRV stopped adjacent to a wayside fire
A−2 Fire/smoke on station platform Ca−2 Electrical wiring fault
A−3 Fire/smoke on alignment Ca−3 Fire on station
Ca−4 Fire on wayside building or brush
A−4 Fire/smoke on station platform Ca−4 Electrical wiring fault
Road vehicle breaks gate arm
  and fouls track
Warning at crossing
Insuficient warning 
before gates descends
Grade crossing warning system 
failed  or not visible or audible
Crossing
Grade crossing 
warning system
physicalLocationOf
physicalLocationOf
isMemberOf
is
C
a
u
s
e
O
f
behaviouralLocationOf behaviouralLocationOf
physicalScopeOf physicalScopeOf
Figure 10: Relationships among individuals, exemplifying the relations that are used in example 5.2
Insuficient warning before 
gates descends
isCauseOf
possibleEntailment
isIndirectCauseOf
Road vehicle breaks 
gate arms and fouls track
Grade crossing warning system failed,
not visible or audible
Figure 11: Possible causality relationship
Table 3: Table that represents another small subset of the PHA for the case study (Evans and Associates, 2006)
Hazard Cause
TC−8 Road vehicle breaks gate arm and fouls track Ca−8 Insufficient warning before gate descends
TC−6 Grade crossing warning system failed, Ca−6 Equipment malfunction
or not visible or audible
failed, or not visible or audible. They might not be
synonyms but there is a possible entailment relation
between them. The final decision about this relation-
ship is left to the analyst. What we can conclude is
that there is a causality relationship between hazard
Grade crossing warning system failed, or not visible
or audible and hazard Road vehicle breaks gate arm
and fouls track as shown in Figure 11. In the next sec-
tion we draw the conclusions and discuss future work.
6 DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
In this paper we defined a state-based hazard pro-
cess for model-based exploration of the dependencies
between causes and consequences of hazards. In addi-
tion, we showed how ontologies can be used to reason
about these dependencies. This method can be used
to automate the analysis of preliminary hazard work-
sheets with the aims of making them more precise,
disambiguating causal relationships, and supporting
the proper definition of system boundaries. Our anal-
ysis process is supported by an ontology that can
help analysts to find nonlinear causal relationships,
and to disambiguate identified hazards and causes. A
demonstration of the approach was given using an in-
dustrial example, the PHA of the West Corridor LRT
System (Evans and Associates, 2006).
A thorough validation of our ontology is in
progress. We are currently working on two exam-
ples related to medical infusion pumps and an e-
voting system. This will allow us to instantiate the
ontology for real world situations, and check that
the ontology is truly capturing the domain concep-
tualisation. This is a well grounded evaluation pro-
cess (de Almeida Falbo, 2014).
Specialised tools are needed to better support our
analysis process. We believe that for a safety analyst
using Protege 5.0 might add more work to their tasks.
Our idea is that there should be a front-end tool that
interacts with the analyst and with the ontology. This
way, the input of data will be more user-friendly to the
safety analyst and the results could also be presented
in a more understandable way to the user.
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